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ABSTRACT
On December 1, 2015, amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure took effect. The changes included, among other things, the ab-
rogation of the Appendix of Forms, which contained templates for
summons, complaints, answers, and other litigation documents. Prior
to its abrogation, Form 18—a template for a “Complaint for Patent
Infringement”—was widely utilized by patent plaintiffs in crafting in-
fringement complaints. Form 18 was created during the Conley plead-
ing regime, when conclusory allegations were generally sufficient to
survive a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the sample allegations in
Form 18 were conclusory and bare-bones in nature. Under Conley,
plaintiffs who followed this template almost always survived motions to
dismiss. In 2007, the Supreme Court announced a heightened pleading
standard in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, and in 2009, it clarified that the
new standard applied to all federal civil cases. Under the new stan-
dard, conclusory allegations alone are not sufficient, and complaints
must be plausible on their face. Despite clear direction from the Su-
preme Court that the new “plausibility” standard applied to all cases,
the Federal Circuit and many district courts continued to allow patent
infringement plaintiffs to use Form 18’s conclusory language. With the
elimination of Form 18 from the Federal Rules, courts are now unques-
tionably bound to apply the plausibility standard to patent infringement
pleadings. Under the plausibility standard, plaintiffs will likely be re-
quired to identify the patent claims they believe are infringed. Depend-
ing on the complexity of the patent and the defendant’s business,
plaintiffs may also be required to identify the accused product by name
or model number. Finally, to move a claim across the line from con-
ceivable to plausible, plaintiffs may need to allege that each claim limi-
tation has a corresponding element in the accused product. The
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Northern District of California’s Patent Local Rules would serve as a
close approximation of the approach outlined here. These heightened
requirements will reduce frivolous pleadings, decrease discovery costs,
and encourage early settlement in competitor cases.
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INTRODUCTION
In early 2015, the Supreme Court adopted several amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 The amendments, which were initially
suggested by the Judicial Conference of the United States, officially went
into effect on December 1, 2015, and included the abrogation of Rule 84 and
the Appendix of Forms.2 Rule 84 endorsed the Forms, stating that they “suf-
fice under these rules and illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these rules
contemplate.”3 The Forms included templates for summons, complaints, an-
swers, judgments, and other litigation documents4 and illustrated how the
Federal Rules should be applied in practice.5
In its report to the Judicial Conference, the Committee on Rules of Prac-
tice and Procedure noted that the Forms were out of date, rarely used, and
1. Supreme Court of the United States, Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (Apr. 29, 2015), http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv15_5h25.pdf.
2. Report of the Judicial Conference, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
(September 2014), at app. B-19, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/
committee-reports/reports-judicial-conference-september-2014.
3. FED. R. CIV. P. 84 (2007) (repealed 2015).
4. See Report of the Judicial Conference, supra note 2.
5. See Brooke D. Coleman, Deserving of Attention: The Proposed Abrogation of Civil
Rule 84 & the Official Forms, PATENTLY-O (Feb. 24, 2014), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2014/
02/deserving-attention-abrogation.html.
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difficult to amend.6 In particular, the Committee noted that “[t]he sample
complaints . . . embrace far fewer causes of action than now exist in federal
court and illustrate a simplicity of pleading that has not been used in many
years.”7 The report refers to the more stringent “plausibility” pleading stan-
dard that the Supreme Court adopted in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal.8 That standard requires plaintiffs to plead “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”9 The Committee noted
that the single most asserted objection to the elimination of the Forms was
that it would be viewed as an endorsement of the new standard.10 Neverthe-
less, the Committee opted to remain silent on that issue, stating simply that it
“continues to review the effects of Twombly and Iqbal.”11
The abrogation of the Forms will likely have a large impact on patent
litigation due to patent plaintiff’s historically heavy reliance on Form 18 (the
template for a “Complaint for Patent Infringement”) in crafting infringement
complaints. Statistics compiled by Lex Machina on patent infringement fil-
ings are particularly illustrative of this point: a record-setting 790 patent in-
fringement suits were filed in federal district courts last November.12 On
November 30—one day before the new Federal Rules took effect—259 pat-
ent suits were filed, a 15-fold increase over an average day.13 These statistics
suggest that many plaintiffs feared that patent pleading without Form 18
would be significantly more difficult.
This note explores the state of patent litigation pleading before and after
Twombly and Iqbal and predicts the effects of the abrogation of Rule 84 and
Form 18. Part I provides background information on patent infringement
litigation and explores pleading under the Conley regime. Part II examines
the Northern District of California’s innovative Patent Local Rules—which
established a heightened pleading standard for patent plaintiffs—in order to
discern their feasibility as a potential model for all federal courts to follow.
Part III explores how patent courts reacted to the heightened plausibility
standard announced in Twombly and Iqbal. Finally, Part IV predicts how
federal courts will apply the plausibility standard to patent pleadings now
that Rule 84 and Form 18 have been repealed.
6. See Report of the Judicial Conference, supra note 2.
7. Id.
8. Id. at app. B-20.
9. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
10. See Report of the Judicial Conference, supra note 2, at app. B-20.
11. Id.
12. Joe Mullin, Patent trolls filed hundreds of lawsuits to beat Dec. 1 deadline, AR-
STECHNICA (Dec. 2, 2015, 9:10 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/12/patent-trolls-
filed-hundreds-of-lawsuits-to-beat-dec-1-deadline/.
13. Manatt Phelps & Phillips LLP, Under the Wire: Record Number of Patent Lawsuits
Filed on November 30, 2015, the Day Before Elimination of Plaintiff-Friendly FRCP Pleading
Standards, LEXOLOGY (Dec. 22, 2015), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b18df8
85-13cd-4f95-895a-8c955f12ed85.
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I. BACKGROUND ON PATENT PLEADING
A. Background on Patent Litigation
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office grants utility patents on inven-
tions that are novel, non-obvious, useful, definite, and directed toward pat-
entable subject matter.14 A patent application must also describe the
underlying invention in sufficient detail to enable a person of ordinary skill
in the art to make and use the invention.15 In exchange for public disclosure
of an invention in a published patent, the owner of a patent is granted an
exclusive 20-year monopoly on the invention.16 This quid pro quo exchange
incentivizes both private innovation and public dissemination of informa-
tion.17 Pursuant to its Article I enumerated power to “promote the Progress
of Science and the Useful Arts,”18 Congress has passed numerous statutes
governing both the granting and litigating of patents.
Federal law allows the owner of a patent to bring a patent infringement
suit if the owner’s patented invention is made, used, sold, offered for sale, or
imported into the U.S. without the owner’s permission.19 A patent owner can
sue for either direct or indirect infringement. Direct infringement occurs
when a single individual or entity makes, uses, offers to sell, sells, or imports
a patented invention without the patent-holder’s permission.20 Indirect in-
fringement occurs when a party induces or contributes to a third party’s di-
rect infringement of the patent at issue.21 Inducement occurs when a person
actively and knowingly aids in another’s direct infringement.22 Plaintiffs
may show inducement by referring to a company’s user manuals or adver-
tisements that direct customers to practice the infringing method.23 Mean-
while, contributory infringement occurs when a person supplies a
component of a patented invention for which no “substantial non-infringing
uses” exist.24
The group of “claims” at the end of a patent is its most important feature
for purposes of patent infringement lawsuits. Patents can contain dozens of
individual claims, which collectively define the contours of the patent
14. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, 112(b) (2012).
15. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012).
16. 35 U.S.C. § 154(b) (2012).
17. See ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POL-
ICY: CASES AND MATERIALS 2 (6th ed. 2013) (“social benefits via technological progress are
achieved by means of private rewards”) (emphasis in original).
18. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
19. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).
20. Id.
21. Id. at § 271(b)-(c).
22. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 17, at 870.
23. See, e.g., CAP Co., Ltd. v. McAfee, Inc., No. 14-CV-05068, 2015 WL 3945875, at
*3 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2015).
24. See MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 17, at 870.
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owner’s rights.25 Similar to a real property deed, the claims delineate what is
owned from what is not.26 Each claim comprises one or more elements, or
“limitations,” which are the primary features of the invention.27 For device
patents, the elements are typically the device’s individual components, and
for process patents, the elements are the particular steps in the patented pro-
cess. To prove infringement, a patent owner must show that the alleged in-
fringer practiced each and every element of at least one valid patent claim.
For example, in the case of a device patent, the patentee must show that the
allegedly infringing device contains each and every element, or a functional
equivalent of each and every element, of at least one claim.
Because claim limitations often contain words or phrases that have a
distinctive meaning in the technology area of the patent, every claim at issue
in an infringement suit must undergo “claim construction.” Claim construc-
tion is the process by which a court construes any ambiguous claim terms in
the patent so that the allegedly infringing product can be more easily com-
pared to the allegedly infringed claim.28 In general, a court will refer to in-
trinsic sources such as the patent’s written description, and to extrinsic
sources such as expert testimony and technical dictionaries, to give a more
discernable meaning to ambiguous claim terms.29 After claim construction,
the court can compare the patent-in-suit to the allegedly infringing product
and determine whether infringement actually occurred. Federal district
courts have original jurisdiction over patent infringement suits. The Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, known for its patent law expertise, has ex-
clusive appellate jurisdiction over patent suits.30
B. Pleading Under Conley
From 1957 until 2007, Conley v. Gibson governed the interpretation of
Rule 8(a)(2)31 of the Federal Rules as it pertains to pleading in federal civil
cases.32 Conley was a class-action discrimination suit brought by African-
American employees of a railroad company.33 The respondents argued that
the complaint failed to set forth specific facts to support the alleged discrimi-
nation.34 Reversing the lower court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, the Su-
preme Court held that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to
25. Id. at 861.
26. Id. at 26.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 756.
29. See generally, Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2012).
31. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (“A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”).
32. See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 387 (Wolters Kluwer Law & Business
ed., 8th ed. 2012).
33. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 42 (1957).
34. Id. at 47.
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state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.”35 This
was commonly referred to as “notice pleading”36 and was generally regarded
by courts and commentators as a lenient standard.37 Under notice pleading, a
claimant was not required “to set out in detail the facts upon which he
base[d] his claim.”38 Rather, Conley specified that Rule 8 required only that
the plaintiff give the defendant fair notice of his claim and the grounds upon
which it rested.39 Because notice pleading did not require plaintiffs to allege
specific facts, cases had to proceed all the way through the costly and time-
consuming process of discovery before meritless claims could be weeded
out.40
The Conley court also explicitly endorsed the use of the now defunct
Forms in making complaints.41 Accordingly, in the years following Conley,
courts generally held that patent infringement complaints made in the mold
of Form 18 were sufficient to meet the Conley pleading standard and over-
come a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.42 Form 18 required:
(1) a statement of jurisdiction,
(2) a statement that the plaintiff owned the patent in question,
(3) a statement that the defendant infringed the patent by making,
using, or selling a device embodying the patent,
(4) a statement that the plaintiff gave the defendant written notice
of infringement, and
(5) a demand for relief.
In Phonometrics, Inc. v. Hospitality Franchise Systems, Inc., the Federal
Circuit had occasion to address how the Conley pleading standard applied to
patent infringement complaints. The patent-in-suit claimed a system for
long-distance call cost accounting, and the defendants used such a system in
their hotels.43 The plaintiff’s complaint did not identify the manufacturer of
35. Id. at 45-46.
36. See YEAZELL, supra note 32, at 387.
37. Id. at 388 (“discovery, not pleading, will do the major sorting between grounded and
ungrounded claims”).
38. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
39. Id.
40. YEAZELL, supra note 32, at 387.
41. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47 (“The illustrative forms appended to the Rules plainly
demonstrate [that all the Rules require is a short and plain statement of the claim].”).
42. See, e.g., Nichia Corp. v. Seoul Semiconductor Ltd., No. C-06-0162 MMC, 2006
WL 1233148, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2006); Tippmann Pneumatics, LLC v. Brass Eagle,
LLC, No. 1:04-CV-449-TLS, 2005 WL 2456908, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 4, 2005). Nichia refers
to Form 16. This form was later renumbered to Form 18.
43. Phonometrics, Inc. v. Hospitality Franchise Sys., Inc., 203 F.3d 790, 790 (Fed. Cir.
2000).
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the system, a particular infringing product that embodied the system, or fea-
tures of the system that matched the claim elements.44 The district court
dismissed the plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim, holding that a
patent plaintiff must allege infringement of particular claim elements in or-
der to survive a motion to dismiss.45 The Federal Circuit reversed, finding
that “pleading requirements for a complaint of infringement cannot be ex-
tended to require a plaintiff to specifically include each element of the
claims of the asserted patent” because “such requirements would contravene
the notice pleading standard.”46 Instead, the court held that the plaintiff’s
complaint was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss because it:
(1) asserted ownership of the patent,
(2) named each individual defendant,
(3) cited the patent that was allegedly infringed,
(4) described the means by which infringement occurred, and
(5) named the relevant statutory provisions.47
The five Phonometrics requirements closely mirror the requirements
contained in Form 18, except that the fourth Phonometrics requirement
(which mirrors the third Form 18 requirement) appears to place a heavier
burden on the plaintiff than does Form 18. The latter requires only a con-
clusory statement that the defendant infringed the patent by making, using,
or selling a device embodying the patent; the former requires a plaintiff to
describe the means by which infringement occurred.
Despite this apparent difference, courts have not generally interpreted
the fourth Phonometrics requirement as placing a higher burden on patent
plaintiffs. For example, in LG Electronics, Inc. v. Asustek Computers, a dis-
trict court found that the conclusory allegation that the defendant was “mak-
ing, selling, offering to sell, using, or importing into the United States
computer systems embodying the claimed patents” was sufficient to over-
come a motion to dismiss under the requirements of Phonometrics.48 While
the plaintiff in LG Electronics likely satisfied the requirements of Form 18,
the court’s conclusion that the plaintiff complied with all of the Pho-
nometrics requirements is more dubious. First, the complaint simply par-
roted the language of 35 U.S.C. § 271(a)—the statute defining patent
infringement—by listing all of the possible infringing actions without even
specifying which infringing action it was alleging (notice the “or” in the
44. Brief for Appellees at *4, Phonometrics, Inc. v. Hospitality Franchise Sys., Inc., 203
F.3d 790 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (No. 99-1086), 1999 WL 33607432.
45. Phonometrics, 203 F.3d at 792.
46. Id. at 794.
47. Id.
48. LG Elecs., Inc. v. Asustek Computers., 126 F. Supp. 2d 414, 418 (E.D. Va. 2000).
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complaint).49 Second, the broad reference to “computer systems embodying
the claimed patent” hardly gives a computer company fair notice of what
product the claim is directed toward. Given these flaws, the complaint in LG
Electronics should have failed under the Phonometrics test because it failed
to “describe[ ] the means by which infringement occurred” with any speci-
ficity whatsoever. The fact that the LG Electronics court denied the motion
to dismiss suggests that, despite the court’s statement to the contrary, the
standard it used to evaluate the plaintiff’s complaint was Form 18, not
Phonometrics.
In other cases, courts more explicitly followed Form 18’s guidelines. In
Nichia Corp. v. Seoul Semiconductor Ltd., the district court addressed the
argument that a complaint must allege specific consumer products sold.50
The court held that, in light of the example language used in Form 18, the
plaintiff’s allegation that the defendant sold products containing its patented
“902 series LED” was sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss.51 In par-
ticular, the court argued that the plaintiff’s reference to the “902 series LED”
was at least as specific, if not more so, than a reference to “electric motors
embodying the patented invention” (the sample language in Form 18).52
Consequently, the court concluded that the complaint was sufficient under
Rule 8(a)(2).53 Cases like LG Electronics and Nichia demonstrate that dis-
trict courts did not necessarily follow the holding of Phonometrics by impos-
ing a stricter pleading standard than Form 18. Instead, district courts around
the country generally held that a conclusory allegation of infringement was
sufficient to “describe the means by which the defendant allegedly
infringed.”54
However, a small number of jurisdictions were more critical of Form 18
complaints. For example, the court in Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Intergraph
Corp. held that conclusory allegations did not provide the defendant with
fair notice of the plaintiff’s claims.55 The complaint in Hewlett-Packard al-
leged that the defendant infringed by “making, using, offering to sell and/or
selling infringing software and hardware products without authority or li-
49. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United
States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent
therefor, infringes the patent.”).




54. See, e.g., Tippmann Pneumatics, LLC v. Brass Eagle, LLC, No. 1:04-CV-449-TLS,
2005 WL 2456908, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Oct. 4, 2005); Digigan, Inc. v. Ivalidate, Inc., No. 02 Civ.
420 (RCC), 2004 WL 203010, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2004).
55. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Intergraph Corp., No. C 03-2517 MJJ, 2003 WL 23884794,
at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2003).
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cense from Plaintiff.”56 However, the court noted that “hardware and
software products” could encompass any or all of the defendant’s more than
4000 end-user application products.57 Comparing the instant complaint to the
“electric motors” example from Form 18, the court stated:
Not only is the example in Form [18] limited to a single “type” of
product (i.e. electric motors) there is no indication as to the number
of different electric motors the hypothetical defendant made, sold,
or used. In this case, there are at least 150 different “types” of prod-
ucts (i.e. core technology platforms) with more than 4000 end-user
applications.58
The court then concluded that the allegations did not give the defendant fair
notice of the plaintiff’s claims due to the sheer number of products that those
claims could be directed to.59 The minority view that the Hewlett-Packard
court adopted correctly held that conclusory allegations are not necessarily
sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss, even under Conley notice
pleading.
In the abstract, the requirements set forth in Phonometrics appeared to
comport with notice pleading; if the plaintiff identified the allegedly in-
fringed patent and how the defendant infringed it, then the defendant would
have fair notice of the plaintiff’s claims. In Phonometrics, there is little
doubt that the defendant received fair notice. Although the plaintiff did not
identify the manufacturer of the defendant’s call-cost accounting system or a
particular infringing product that embodied the system,60 the allegations in
the complaint made it clear what the defendant was being accused of. This is
the essence of notice pleading. But as Hewlett-Packard clearly demon-
strated, complex cases may require more specificity than what Phonometrics
and its progeny called for. Particularly when multiple patents and claims are
at issue and the defendant sells many products in the technology area, the
plaintiff may need to allege more specifically how the patent is infringed to
truly put the defendant on notice.
II. PATENT LOCAL RULES: THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA’S
UNIQUE HEIGHTENED PLEADING
To raise the ostensibly low bar to survive a motion to dismiss under
Conley and Form 18, some jurisdictions have promulgated local rules which





60. Brief for Appellees at *4, Phonometrics, Inc. v. Hospitality Franchise Sys., Inc., 203
F.3d 790 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (No. 99-1086), 1999 WL 33607432.
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trial requirements on both plaintiffs and defendants.61 The first set of rules
was promulgated by the Northern District of California (“Northern District”)
in December 2000.62 The Northern District’s rules were designed to address
the unique challenges that arise during patent litigation.63 According to
James Ware (former Chief Judge of the Northern District of California) and
Brian Davy (a patent practitioner), California’s rules “dramatically
heighten[ ]” the level of specificity required of a patent claimant and replace
the interrogatories the defendant would otherwise have to serve on the plain-
tiff.64 Rule 3-1 requires that the plaintiff serve a Disclosure of Asserted
Claims and Infringement Contentions (“infringement contentions”) on all
parties no later than 14 days after the Initial Case Management Conference.65
Subsection (a) requires that the plaintiff identify each claim of each patent-
in-suit that is allegedly infringed by each opposing party.66 For each alleg-
edly infringed claim, the plaintiff must identify the infringing device by
name or model number.67 Furthermore, for each allegedly infringing device,
the plaintiff must identify how that device practices each and every element
of the allegedly infringed claim or claims.68 This information must be
presented in a “claim chart” so that elements and corresponding device ele-
ments can be compared side-by-side.69 Finally, to fully comply with Rule 3-
1, the plaintiff must include a meaningful explanation as to how the infring-
ing device reads on the infringed patent claim,70 which may require the
plaintiff to reverse engineer the device in order to determine the location and
function of each component.71
The Patent Local Rules in the Northern District of California are cer-
tainly more onerous than the pleading requirements imposed by Form 18.
61. James Ware & Brian Davy, The History, Content, Application and Influence of the
Northern District of California’s Patent Local Rules, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 965, 1012 (2008). The Northern District of Georgia, Eastern District of Texas,
Western District of Pennsylvania, District of Minnesota, and numerous others have followed
the Northern District of California’s lead.
62. Id. at 965.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 984.
65. N.D. CAL. PATENT L.R. 3-1 (“Not later than 14 days after the Initial Case Manage-
ment Conference, a party claiming patent infringement shall serve on all parties a ‘Disclosure
of Asserted Claims and Infringement Contentions.’ ”).
66. Id. at 3-1(a).
67. Id. at 3-1(b).
68. Id. at 3-1(c).
69. Id.
70. Ware, supra note 61, at 985 (citing InterTrust Techs. Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., No.
C 01-1640 SBA, 2003 WL 23120174, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2003)).
71. Bender v. Maxim Integrated Prods., Inc., No. C 09-01152 SI, 2010 WL 1135762, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2010) (quoting Network Caching Tech., LLC v. Novell, Inc., No. C-01-
2079-VRW, 2003 WL 32126128, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2002)) (holding that plaintiff’s
infringement contentions did not comply with Patent Local Rule 3-1 because plaintiff did not
identify a particular element within an integrated circuit but rather assumed it was there).
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While Form 18 did not require a plaintiff to identify a particular infringing
product—and in fact explicitly rejected the argument that the plaintiff must
“include specific allegations about each [claim] limitation”72—the Patent
Local Rules require an element-by-element analysis of the allegedly in-
fringed claims.73 Given that the infringement contentions required by Rule
3-1 must be submitted prior to discovery,74 a plaintiff has access to substan-
tially the same information when serving the infringement contentions as
when filing the initial complaint. The practical effect of this is a heightened
pleading standard, since the plaintiff must allege each infringement claim
with specificity before the case proceeds to discovery.
Though Rule 3-1 does increase the pleading burden on the parties in-
volved in patent suits, this effect has been curbed by several judicial inter-
pretations that limit the specificity the rule requires.75 For example, one
court held that a plaintiff is under no obligation to provide evidence support-
ing the assertions in its claim chart.76 Rule 3-1 is designed only to require a
plaintiff to crystalize its theory of infringement.77 Since infringement conten-
tions are served prior to discovery, requiring evidence at that stage would be
unduly burdensome. Also, when there are multiple infringing products in the
same product family—and the products within that family are indistinguish-
able with respect to how they infringe—a plaintiff is not required to disclose
each product separately.78
With the abrogation of the Forms, courts could use the Northern Dis-
trict’s Patent Local Rules as a model pleading standard in patent infringe-
ment suits. By requiring the plaintiff to identify the allegedly infringed
claims and allegedly infringing products—and by further requiring an ele-
ment-by-element comparison between those claims and products—the rules
undoubtedly meet the elevated plausibility pleading standard announced in
Twombly and Iqbal.79 Moreover, the rules are not unduly burdensome on
72. Phonometrics, 203 F.3d at 794.
73. N.D. CAL. PATENT L.R. 3-1.
74. In particular, Rule 3-4 states that “[s]ource code, specifications, schematics, flow
charts, artwork, formulas, or other documentation” related to the allegedly infringing products
are not produced by the defendant until “after service upon it of the ‘Disclosure of Asserted
Claims and Infringement Contentions.’ ” (emphasis added).
75. Ware, supra note 61, at 985.
76. Id. at 985 (citing Network Caching Tech., LLC v. Novell, Inc., No. C-01-2079
VRW, 2003 WL 21699799, at *4 (N.D. Cal. March 21, 2003)).
77. Network Caching Tech., LLC v. Novell, Inc., No. C-01-2079 VRW, 2003 WL
21699799, at *4 (N.D. Cal. March 21, 2003) (quoting Atmel Corp. v. Info. Storage Devices
Inc., No. C 95-1987 FMS, 1998 WL 775115, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 1998)).
78. Ware, supra note 61, at 985 (citing Renesas Tech. Corp. v. Nanya Tech. Corp., No.
C03-05709JF(HRL), 2005 WL 2000926 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2005)).
79. Macronix Int’l. Co., Ltd. v. Spansion Inc., 4 F. Supp. 3d 797, 803 (E.D. Va. 2014)
(“[s]atisfying the requirements of Twombly and Iqbal, of course, will require counsel to focus
complaints only on viable claims. Thus, before filing a complaint, counsel must ascertain ex-
actly what claims [be] alleged to be infringed and how they are infringed.”).
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patent plaintiffs, as plaintiffs are not required to produce evidence of in-
fringement when comparing patent claims to allegedly infringing products.
Rather, the rules serve to provide notice of infringement to defendants “be-
yond the mere language of the patent,” while also requiring plaintiffs to
crystallize their theory of infringement early on in the litigation.80
III. PATENT PLEADING UNDER TWOMBLY AND IQBAL
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court replaced the no-
tice pleading standard with a heightened plausibility standard.81 In order to
survive a motion to dismiss under this new standard, a plaintiff must set
forth “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” (as
opposed to facts that are merely conceivable).82 Initially, practitioners de-
bated whether this heightened pleading standard applied only in antitrust
actions (the context of Twombly), or more broadly to all federal civil
actions.83
In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court reiterated and expounded on the
Twombly standard, holding that it was “the pleading standard for ‘all civil
actions,’ ”84 and clarifying that the standard is met when “the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct.”85 The court also emphasized that
determining whether a complaint is plausible is a context-specific task,86 and
in-fact the context surrounding Iqbal was particularly important to the
court’s decision to dismiss the complaint.87 The respondent in Iqbal alleged
that the petitioners purposefully classified Muslims and other Arabs as ‘of
high interest’ because of their religion or race, constituting invidious dis-
crimination.88 The court concluded that, more likely, there was a disparate,
incidental impact on Muslims and Arabs because law enforcement officers
were targeting individuals with links to Al Qaeda—an organization com-
posed largely of Arab Muslims—in the wake of the September 11 attacks.89
In the context of those attacks and the subsequent law enforcement response,
that was the most likely conclusion. Finally, the court noted that “while legal
conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be sup-
ported by factual allegations.”90
80. Network Caching Tech., LLC v. Novell, Inc., No. C-01-2079-VRW, 2003 WL
32126128, at *3-4 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2002).
81. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 546.
82. Id. at 570.
83. YEAZELL, supra note 32, at 389.
84. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1).
85. Id. at 678.
86. Id. at 663-64. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
87. Id. at 687.
88. Id. at 681.
89. Id. at 682.
90. Id. at 679.
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Together, Twombly and Iqbal shifted the pleading paradigm in federal
civil cases. Under Conley, a conceivable complaint supported by only con-
clusory allegations could survive a motion to dismiss. Under the new re-
gime, complaints must be facially plausible and supported by at least some
factual allegations.
A. Confusion after McZeal
Since Twombly and Iqbal, federal courts have struggled to reconcile the
plausibility standard with Form 18. Form 18 was created when Conley was
in force and contains only conclusory statements, which are inconsistent
with the principles espoused by Twombly and Iqbal. In fact, Iqbal explicitly
held that legal conclusions alone are insufficient to survive a motion to
dismiss.91
The Federal Circuit first addressed this tension in McZeal v. Sprint
Nextel Corp. McZeal, the inventor of the patent at issue and a pro se litigant,
sued Sprint for patent infringement for sale of the Motorola i930 cellphone.92
McZeal held that the plaintiff’s complaint met all of the requirements of
Form 18 and contained enough information to allow the defendants to re-
spond.93 Although the McZeal court claimed to apply the Twombly stan-
dard,94 later courts and commentators have questioned whether this was
actually the case.95 There are several reasons for this doubt. First, McZeal
was decided before Iqbal, when the Supreme Court clarified that the holding
in Twombly applied to all federal civil actions.96 Second, the court specifi-
cally acknowledged that pro se litigants may be granted leeway on procedu-
ral matters such as pleading requirements.97 Third, the McZeal court
questioned the entire premise that Twombly changed the pleading require-
ments as articulated in Conley, noting in a footnote that Twombly “favorably
quoted Conley.”98 Consequently, it is not entirely clear whether the McZeal
court held that Form 18 met the requirements of Twombly, or whether—due
to the unique circumstances of the case—the court simply applied the old
Conley standard.
91. Id.
92. McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
93. Id.
94. In particular, the McZeal court quoted sections of Twombly that emphasized the
continued importance of fair notice to the defendant. The court did not quote the ultimate
holding in Twombly that a claim for relief must be plausible on its face. Id.
95. See, e.g., R. David Donoghue, The Uneven Application of Twombly in Patent
Cases: An Argument for Leveling the Playing Field, 8 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 8
(2008).
96. McZeal, 501 F.3d at 1356.
97. Id.
98. Id. at n. 4 (“This does not suggest that Bell Atlantic changed the pleading require-
ment of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 as articulated in Conley.”).
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The confusion caused by McZeal was exacerbated following the Iqbal
decision. Two cases in particular, W.L. Gore & Associates v. Medtronic, Inc.
and Bender v. LG Electronics U.S.A., Inc., illustrate this confusion. The
Medtronic court discussed the interplay of Twombly, Iqbal, McZeal, and
Form 18 at length.99 The court observed that Form 18 appears to contain
conclusory statements of the type that do not suffice to survive a motion to
dismiss,100 opining that the “scant factual allegations found in this form . . .
appear to conflict with Twombly’s plausibility standard.”101 Nonetheless, the
court—espousing the more widespread view following McZeal—held that a
complaint crafted in the mold of Form 18 sufficiently states a claim for di-
rect infringement.102 In reaching that conclusion, the court relied on both
Rule 84 (which it noted endorsed the Forms explicitly)103 and the Supreme
Court’s own statements in Twombly that the Federal Rules can only be
changed through amendment and not through judicial interpretation.104
The Medtronic court’s reasoning, however, fails to account for the
meaningful interpretive role of the judiciary. While it is true that the judici-
ary cannot change the text of a rule or statute, it can certainly change, in
good faith, the meaning or application of codified text. Through judicial
interpretation, courts elucidate the intended meaning of ambiguous rules like
Rule 8, and reasonable courts may differ in their conclusions about the in-
tended meaning. In fact, this is the entire premise of the Twombly decision;
the Supreme Court viewed the Conley court’s interpretation of Rule 8(a)(2)
as incorrect and announced its own interpretation that became equally bind-
ing on lower courts as the text of the rule. In doing so, the Court put Rule 8
at odds with Form 18. According to the “last in time rule,” Rule 8—inter-
preted more recently—should have prevailed. The recent abrogation of Rule
84 and Form 18 support this conclusion. Form 18 was at odds with
Twombly, and presumably, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Proce-
dure recognized this. In particular, the Committee noted that the pleading
illustrated in the Forms is inconsistent with the detailed pleading in most
modern cases.105
Other courts have disagreed with Medtronic’s approach. In Bender v.
LG Electronics, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant infringed its patent
by making, using or selling products containing a particular current feedback
amplifier. In its complaint, the plaintiff listed dozens of product types that
99. W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 667 (E.D. Va. 2011).
100. Id. at 674 (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)) (“While Iqbal counsels
that ‘[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements, do not suffice to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), Form 18 appears
to contain just that.’ ”).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 675.
103. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 84 (2007) (repealed 2015)).
104. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 569 n. 14).
105. Report of the Judicial Conference, supra note 2, at app. B-19.
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contained the infringing amplifier, including, “without limitation, cell
phones, computers, network drivers, [HD] television set, ultrasound ma-
chines, MRI machines, lab equipment,” and many more.106 The court held
that Twombly and Iqbal did apply to patent pleadings:
Bender’s infringement claim fails to provide a “plausible claim for
relief” under Twombly and Iqbal. . . . Sufficient allegations would
include, at a minimum, a brief description of what the patent at is-
sue does, and an allegation that certain named and specifically iden-
tified products or product components also do what the patent does,
thereby raising a plausible claim that the named products are
infringing.107
The court distinguished McZeal by noting that it was decided before
Iqbal.108 It also emphasized that determining plausibility is a context-specific
task.109 The court observed that the list of products in the complaint was
directed toward millions of electrical circuits designed by the defendant.110
Due to the large number of potentially infringing products, the plaintiff’s
vague complaint did not put the defendant on notice.111 In its discussion, the
court seemed to suggest that less specificity may be required when fewer
infringing products are involved.112 Such a sliding scale would comport with
the concept of fair notice because a defendant with a limited number of
potentially infringing products would have a much easier time connecting
the complaint to a product than a defendant with millions of products.
In the confusing wake of McZeal, the Federal Circuit stepped up to clar-
ify how to reconcile the Twombly pleading standard with Form 18.
B. “The Forms Control”
In 2012, following Iqbal and numerous contradictory holdings by the
district courts,113 the Federal Circuit addressed the question of whether the
106. Bender v. LG Elecs. U.S.A., Inc., No. C 09-02114 JF (PVT), 2010 WL 889541, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2010).
107. Id. at *6.




112. See id. at *5 (“Similarly in Hewlett–Packard v. Intergraph, the court explained that
the example in Form 18 is ‘limited to a single ‘type’ of product’ and ‘simply does not address
a factual scenario’ involving a multitude of allegedly infringing products.”) (quoting Hewlett-
Packard v. Intergraph, No. C 03–2517 MJJ., 2003 WL 23884794 at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6,
2003).
113. See, e.g., Bender, 2010 WL 889541, at *6; Lantiq N. Am., Inc. v. Ralink Tech.
Corp., No. CV 11-00234 EJD, 2011 WL 2600747 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2011); Interval Licens-
ing LLC v. AOL, Inc., No. C10-1385 MJP, 2010 WL 5058620 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 10, 2010);
W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 667 (E.D. Va. 2011).
332 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 22:317
Forms or Twombly and Iqbal control with respect to patent pleadings.114 The
plaintiff in In re Bill of Lading was a freight shipping company that alleged
indirect infringement of its “less-than-a-load”115 trucking method patent.116
The plaintiff alleged that several logistics companies supplied computing
systems to moving companies, thereby contributing to or inducing direct in-
fringement by those moving companies.117 The district court concluded that
the plaintiff, who had relied on Form 18 to craft its complaint, failed to state
a claim and dismissed the case.118 The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that
to the extent that Twombly, Iqbal and Form 18 conflict, the Forms control.119
The court began by noting that the Supreme Court had yet to address the
sufficiency of a complaint for a cause of action for which there was a sample
complaint in the Appendix of Forms.120 Next, the court invoked an argument
substantially similar to the argument in Medtronic—that Rule 84 and the
Forms have supremacy over a judicial interpretation of Rule 8.121 As men-
tioned above, this argument fails to account for the meaningful interpretive
role of the judiciary and the last in time rule.122 Finally, the court stated that
a plaintiff need not compare claim elements to the allegedly infringing prod-
uct,123 or even identify the allegedly infringed claims.124 This is consistent
with the holdings in both McZeal and Medtronics—though of course incon-
sistent with Twombly and Iqbal.
To address the apparent discrepancy between In re Bill of Lading and
Twombly and Iqbal, the Federal Circuit attempted to clarify its views on
Form 18 in its 2013 decision, K-Tech Telecommunications v. Time Warner
Cable.125 The K-Tech court reiterated that in the event of a conflict between
Twombly and Iqbal and Form 18, the Form controls.126 In dicta, however, the
court explained at length that notice and facial plausibility are the corner-
stones of an analysis under the Forms, and that implausible claims should be
114. In re Bill of Lading Transmission and Processing Sys. Patent Litig., 681 F.3d 1323
(Fed. Cir. 2012).
115. Less-than-a-load trucking is the transportation of small freight. Carriers pick up
freight from different customers, and the freight is often destined for different locations around
the country. In order to ensure efficient delivery, freight bound for similar areas is grouped
together. Id. at 1328-29.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1329, 1335-36.
118. Id. at 1331.
119. Id. at 1334 (internal citation omitted).
120. Id. at 1333-34.
121. Id. at 1334
122. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
123. In re Bill of Lading, 681 F.3d at 1335.
124. Id.
125. K-Tech Telecomms. v. Time Warner Cable, 714 F.3d 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
126. Id. at 1279 (“District courts must evaluate complaints alleging direct infringement
by reference to Form 18 . . . ”).
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dismissed.127 It also emphasized that the adequacy of the facts pled depends
on both the complexity of the patent and the defendant’s business.128
It is difficult to reconcile this dicta with the court’s holding. Form 18, at
least as illustrated in the Federal Rules, consists entirely of conclusory state-
ments which are normally insufficient to state a claim to relief under the
Twombly and Iqbal plausibility standard. So it cannot be the case that “Form
18 controls,” but “implausible claim[s] for patent infringement should be
dismissed,” unless the court was reading stricter requirements into Form 18
than appear in its text. This is the only reading of K-Tech that gives effect to
both its holding that the Forms control and its strongly worded dicta that
seems to endorse the plausibility standard of Twombly and Iqbal.
Judge Wallach, concurring in the outcome of K-Tech, but not joining the
majority opinion,129 observed that the majority—while expressly holding
that the Forms control—actually conducted a context-specific plausibility
analysis that otherwise conformed to the Twombly and Iqbal pleading stan-
dard.130 Indeed, the majority’s ultimate holding conflicts with much of its
reasoning. It seems like the court was attempting to lend credence to prior
Federal Circuit decisions while simultaneously acknowledging the binding
character of Twombly and Iqbal. The result was a disjointed opinion that
argued one way but held another.
A minority of district courts have treated Federal Circuit opinions like
K-Tech and McZeal with hostility, arguing that Twombly and Iqbal (and not
the Forms) control with respect to patent pleading.131 The district court in
Macronix International Co. v. Spansion Inc., noted that the majority in
McZeal did not view Twombly as altering the pleading standard—which is at
odds with how Twombly and Iqbal are commonly understood.132 Further-
more, the court argued that both McZeal and In re Bill of Lading are based
on the faulty premise that the Forms remain sufficient to get past the plead-
ing stage until the Federal Rules are changed.133 According to the Macronix
court, Supreme Court decisions like Twombly and Iqbal that instruct how to
127. Id. at 1286 (citations omitted).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1287 (Wallach, J., concurring in part).
130. Id. at 1288-89 (“Moreover, the majority’s analysis of Form 18 compliance is just the
sort of ‘context-specific’ analysis required by the plausibility standard. The majority states the
adequacy of facts pled under Form 18 ‘depends on the breadth and complexity of both the
asserted patent and the accused product or system and on the nature of the defendant’s busi-
ness activities.’ This analysis does not square with the dicta that ‘the Forms control,’ but is
entirely consistent with the framework presented by this concurring opinion.”) (citation
omitted).
131. See, e.g., Macronix, 4 F. Supp. 3d 797.
132. Id. at 801 (quoting McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1356 n. 4 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
133. Id. at 802.
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interpret a Federal Rule are controlling even if there is no change to the text
of the rule being interpreted:134
[I]f the Supreme Court . . . says that Rule 8(a) must be applied
differently than is provided for in a form, then the viability of the
form must be measured against the new standard, even if the effect
of doing so is to nullify the form.135
In essence, the Macronix court applied the last-in-time rule and held that,
since the Supreme Court spoke most recently on the meaning of Rule 8, its
interpretation of Rule 8 should control when there is a conflict with Rule 84.
The Macronix view has been adopted by some district courts, but such
courts are in the minority. Most districts have opted to use the K-Tech ap-
proach—that a complaint in the mold of Form 18 will survive a motion to
dismiss.
IV. THE FUTURE OF PATENT PLEADING: HOW TWOMBLY
MAY BE APPLIED
With the elimination of Rule 84 and Form 18 from the Federal Rules,
district courts are now unquestionably bound by Twombly and Iqbal to apply
the plausibility standard to patent infringement pleadings.136 Several district
courts have indeed already confirmed this.137 Now the question on every-
one’s mind is—what does this mean in practice?
A. Identifying Infringed Claims
In applying Twombly and Iqbal to patent pleadings, courts will likely
require patentees to identify the particular claim or claims allegedly in-
fringed in addition to identifying the patent number.138 Many patents have
dozens of claims, each of which could potentially be infringed; and each
claim has a unique set of limiting elements, so a product could easily in-
fringe one claim but not another. If a patentee does not identify which claims
are allegedly infringed, the defendant is left to speculate and is hindered in
134. Id. (“And, it needs no authority to accept that decisions by the Supreme Court that
instruct how to apply the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are controlling.”).
135. Id.
136. Craig N. Hentschel, Coming Changes to the FRCP Can Affect IP Litigation, SEREN-
DIPITY (June 17, 2015), http://www.ip-lawblog.com/Coming-Changes-to-the-FRCP-Can-Af-
fect-IP-Litigation-06-17-2015.
137. See Mayne Pharma Int’l PTY Ltd. v. Merck & Co., Inc., No. 15-438-LPS-CJB,
2015 WL 7833206, at *6 n.1 (D. Del. Dec. 3, 2015) (“Under the new rules, allegations of
direct infringement will be subject to the pleading standards established by Twombly and
Iqbal, requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate a ‘plausible claim for relief.’ ”); Rembrandt Patent
Innovations LLC v. Apple Inc., No. C 14-05093 WHA, 2015 WL 8607390, at *2 (N.D. Cal.
Dec. 13, 2015) (“Rule 84 has been abrogated, so In re Bill of Lading no longer applies.”).
138. Even under Conley notice pleading, it is surprising that this was not required.
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drafting an answer.139 In other words, the defendant is not given fair notice
of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests. This is consistent with the
court’s position in Macronix when it stated that Twombly “will require coun-
sel to focus complaints only on viable claims.”140 Such a focus will solve the
concern expressed by the Macronix court—that a complaint of vague or con-
clusory allegations would force defendants to “prepare defenses for the
many claims that will inevitably fall by the way side.”141 Given that
Macronix took the position that Twombly and Iqbal (and not Form 18) con-
trol with respect to patent pleadings, courts should treat it as relevant prece-
dent in the absence of Form 18.
B. Identifying Infringing Products
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim to relief is a
context-specific task.142 Even in K-Tech, where the court ultimately held that
the Forms control, it still acknowledged that the plausibility of a complaint
is largely dependent on the complexity of the patent-in-suit, the accused
product or products, and the defendant’s business.143 Thus, in some circum-
stances, plaintiffs may be required to identify the allegedly infringing prod-
uct by name or model number, in addition to the infringed claims.144 For
example, in cases like Hewlett-Packard and Bender, the complaints were
directed toward 4000 end-user products and millions of circuits, respec-
tively.145 In each case, the defendant was left to speculate what the plaintiff
was actually asserting because the complaint was so broad with respect to
the allegedly infringing product or products. This does not constitute fair
notice.
In some instances, though, identifying the patent number may be suffi-
cient to state a claim. For example, an alleged infringer may make or use
only a single product of a certain type. For example, the defendant hotels in
Phonometrics used only a single call-cost accounting system. Despite the
fact that the plaintiff did not and could not name the particular infringing
system by name or model number, it was certainly clear to the defendant
what the plaintiff was referring to in the complaint.
139. See Peter S. Menell et al., Patent Case Management Judicial Guide ch. 2 p. 8,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER (2009), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/patent01.pdf/
$file/patent01.pdf (“Because a plaintiff may assert multiple claims in multiple patents, a defen-
dant reading a notice pleading complaint is typically left to guess as to the boundaries of a
plaintiff’s case and the available defenses.”).
140. Macronix, 4 F. Supp. 3d at 803.
141. Id.
142. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
143. See K-Tech Telecomms., 714 F.3d at 1286.
144. See Bender, 2010 WL 889541, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2010) (holding that suffi-
cient allegations would include, at minimum “certain named and specifically identified prod-
ucts,” among other things).
145. See infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
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In summary, the specificity required of a patent pleading with respect to
the allegedly infringing product will depend on the particular facts of each
case. A simple patent asserted against a defendant selling a single product
will likely require less specificity than a complex patent asserted against a
corporation selling dozens of products in a single technology area.
C. Comparing Claim Limitations to Elements of the
Allegedly Infringing Product
There is also some authority to suggest that plaintiffs will be required to
compare claim limitations to the elements of an allegedly infringing prod-
uct.146 While identifying the infringed claim and infringing product would
likely put the defendant on notice, courts may be hesitant to hold that com-
plaints “cross[ ] the line from conceivable to plausible” if they do not in-
clude allegations that particular claim elements are practiced.147 For
example, the Macronix court held that “alleging how the offending products
[meet] the claims recited” is required to make a plausible showing of in-
fringement.148 The court further held that simply parroting the claim lan-
guage for each element did not satisfy the requirements of Twombly and
Iqbal.149 This reasoning suggests that plaintiffs may have to compare spe-
cific claim limitations to specific product elements in order to survive a mo-
tion to dismiss.
Post-Twombly inducement cases also offer guidance on this issue. Fed-
eral courts, including the Federal Circuit in In re Bill of Lading, have held
that Form 18 applies only to claims of direct infringement.150 This means
that Twombly and Iqbal applied to inducement cases even before the abroga-
tion of the Forms.151 Furthermore, because inducement is predicated on di-
rect infringement, we can examine post-Twombly inducement cases to
ascertain how courts may apply Twombly to direct infringement cases.
In In re Bill of Lading, the defendants were accused of inducing in-
fringement of a method patent for the less-than-a-load trucking industry.152
The patent recited seven steps, including scanning an image of shipping doc-
umentation data, processing that image and transmitting it to a remote
processing center, and, at that remote processing center, preparing a loading
manifest.153 The accused defendants allegedly provided logistics and com-
puting systems to trucking companies, which induced the trucking compa-
146. Macronix, 4 F. Supp. 3d at 804.
147. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 546.
148. Macronix, 4 F. Supp. 3d at 804.
149. Id.
150. In re Bill of Lading, 681 F.3d at 1336.
151. Id. at 1337.
152. Id. at 1328.
153. Id. at 1329.
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nies to infringe the patent.154 In order to support its allegations of
inducement, the plaintiff pointed to numerous statements and advertisements
by the defendants that indicated that the defendants and their customers were
using the patented method.155 For example, the plaintiff pointed to state-
ments and advertisements by the defendants touting their products’ in-cab
scanning and wireless transmission features.156 Other advertisements ex-
plained the benefits of these features, including the ability to assign and
dispatch drivers more quickly.157 Each of these statements encouraged the
defendants’ customers to practice one or more of the steps of the method
patent. In holding that the plaintiff had stated a claim of inducement with
respect to all of the defendants, the court stated that “[i]n some circum-
stances, [the] failure to allege facts that plausibly suggest a specific element
or elements of a claim have been practiced may be fatal in the context of a
motion to dismiss.”158
This logic can be extended to claims of direct infringement.159 If a plain-
tiff fails to allege facts that suggest that a particular element is present in a
product or that a particular step in a method patent is practiced, then the
plaintiff may not survive a motion to dismiss under the Twombly plausibility
standard. This would be a context-specific analysis, as Iqbal demands.160 For
example, although a plaintiff fails to allege facts showing a particular ele-
ment is present in an infringing product, he may survive a motion to dismiss
if he alleges that the element must inherently be present in the product due to
its function. Alleging that each limitation of a patent claim has a correspond-
ing element in the accused product likely takes a claim from conceivable to
plausible.
Plaintiffs may argue that comparing claim limitations to product ele-
ments is unduly burdensome at the pleading stage, but the Northern District
of California has required this since 2000,161 and it remains one of the most
popular forums for patent litigation.162 Additionally, Rule 11 requires that
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1341-46.
156. Id. at 1341-42.
157. Id. at 1343.
158. Id. at 1342.
159. See Macronix, 4 F. Supp. 3d at 799 (citing an earlier court order to plaintiff to
amend its complaint to include “specific claim or claims which are alleged to be infringed, and
the elements thereof that are alleged to be infringed by the allegedly infringing product,” and
then dismissing the amended complaint when the plaintiff failed to do so).
160. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663-64.
161. Ware, supra note 61, at 965.
162. In 2015, the Northern District of California had the fourth most patent filings, be-
hind only the Eastern District of Texas, the District of Delaware, and the Central District of
California. The Eastern District of Texas, the most popular forum by a wide margin, has local
patent rules similar to the Northern District of California’s. See Brian Howard, 2015 End-of-
Year Trends, Patent Litigation, LEX MACHINA (Jan. 7, 2016), https://lexmachina.com/lex-
machina-2015-end-of-year-trends/.
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plaintiffs’ counsel conduct a reasonable inquiry into the legal and factual
bases of the claims.163 The Federal Circuit has held that “at a bare mini-
mum,” a law firm must “apply the claims of each and every patent that is
being brought into the lawsuit to an accused device and conclude that there
is a reasonable basis for a finding of infringement of at least one claim.”164
Since Rule 11 already requires a comparison of the claim limitations to the
elements of the allegedly infringing product, it is hard to imagine that it
would be too burdensome on plaintiffs to require that this information be
included in the complaint and supported by some factual allegations.
In summary, a complaint for patent infringement under Twombly and
Iqbal will, in most circumstances, require more specificity in order to sur-
vive a motion to dismiss than complaints filed prior to the abrogation of the
Forms. Plaintiffs will likely be required to identify the claim or claims it
believes are infringed. Depending on the complexity of the patent and the
defendant’s business, plaintiffs may also be required to identify the accused
product by name or model number. Whether or not this is actually required
will depend on the particular facts of the case. Finally, to move a claim
across the line from conceivable to plausible, plaintiffs may need to allege
that each claim limitation has a corresponding element in the accused prod-
uct. The Northern District of California’s Patent Local Rules would serve as
a close approximation of the approach outlined here.165
CONCLUSION
With the elimination of Rule 84 and Form 18, the plausibility standard
announced in Twombly and Iqbal will apply to patent infringement plead-
ings. The practical result of this change is that plaintiffs will have a harder
time surviving a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Prior to De-
cember 1, 2015, courts struggled to reconcile the conclusory nature of Form
18 with the plausibility standard set forth in Twombly and Iqbal. Now, there
is a clear standard—patent complaints must include much more than Form
18 conclusory statements.
For defendants and federal courts, this is beneficial for several reasons.
First, the elevated pleading standard will discourage frivolous filings by non-
practicing entities, or patent trolls. Filing a complaint that is sufficient under
the new pleading regime will require more diligence and research that patent
trolls may not be willing to undertake. Second, frivolous complaints that are
filed will be disposed of quickly by the courts through motions to dismiss—
163. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
164. View Eng’g, Inc. v. Robotic Vision Sys., Inc., 208 F.3d 981, 986 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
165. It should be noted, though, that the rules are less amendable to context and circum-
stances than this approach. Under the Northern District of California’s Patent Local Rules, the
infringed claims and infringing products must be identified. Also, claim limitations must be
compared to corresponding elements in the accused product; there is little flexibility. N.D.
CAL. PATENT L.R. 3-1.
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conserving time and resources for the courts and parties involved. Third,
tougher pleading requirements will force plaintiffs to crystalize their theory
of infringement early on in the litigation, reducing expenses for both plain-
tiffs and defendants. As the Macronix court succinctly observed:
The current practice is to file a Form 18 complaint and then, using
claim charts, prior art charts, discovery, and motions, to pare claims
that ought not to have been brought or that cannot withstand careful
scrutiny. That process has proven to be an increasingly expensive
proposition for the parties and one that takes a tremendous toll on
already strained judicial resources.166
Now, meritless claims will be weeded out early, greatly reducing the number
of cases proceeding to discovery, allowing parties to avoid the most expen-
sive part of a patent infringement suit. Finally, earlier exploration into the
merits of patent claims in competitor cases will encourage early settlement,
reducing externalities such as legal fees and court costs.167
With the abrogation of the Forms, federal courts will no longer struggle
to reconcile the conclusory nature of Form 18 with the plausibility standard.
Instead, courts must now decide how to apply the plausibility standard to
patent infringement complaints. They must determine, in a context-specific
inquiry, whether complaints for patent infringement are sufficiently plausi-
ble in light of guidance from Twombly, Iqbal, and Macronix. In doing so,
courts may be inclined to look to the Northern District of California’s Patent
Local Rules for guidance. Regardless, it will be interesting to observe how
both courts and plaintiffs react in the absence of the simple template they
once so heavily relied on.
166. Macronix, 4 F. Supp. 3d at 803.
167. On the other hand, plaintiffs with legitimate claims may be discouraged from filing
complaints due to the up-front costs associated with a stricter pleading requirement.
